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Radiation Exposure and
Cancer: A Simpler View of
Three Mile Island
The article by Wing et al. (1) introduced
the idea ofcalculating the relative intensity
of radioactive fallout between sectors of a
circle drawn around the accident at Three
Mile Island. The partition derived from
wind and weather data allowed a compari-
son ofratios ofradiation exposure between
sectors with cancer incidence ratios and
bypassed much ofthe uncertainty involved
in calculating actual doses. The results
indicated that higher fallout was correlated
with higher cancer incidence. Considering
that the average levels of radioactivity in
each sector were low, this could be inter-
preted as evidence for a proportional car-
cinogenic response to low doses ofionizing
radiation. There is, however, a simpler way
to interpret the same set ofdata.
Wing et al. (1) reported that some of
the people exposed to the fallout from the
accident showed signs of acute radiation
damage. They also reported that ground
measurements of radioactivity were not
adequate to show the details ofdistribution
ofthe fallout or the resulting doses to indi-
viduals. We are free to infer that the fallout
was patchy, that some ofthe residents were
exposed to high doses of ionizing radia-
tion, and that the data ofWing et al. (1)
show a correlation ofthe frequency ofhigh
exposure "hits" on people in each sector
with the sector's share of the region's
radioactive burden. In this view, increases
in cancer incidence were simply correlated
with the number of people hit by high
doses of ionizing radiation. This interpre-
tation is consistent with the conclusions
drawn by Raabe et al. (2) from data on
radium dial painters, the data set that
offers the most precise readings of both
individual radiation doses and carcinogenic
effects in humans. It is also consistent with
the patchy distribution of radioactive fall-
out from explosions often observed at the
Nevada Proving Grounds.
George G. Berg
University ofRochester School of
Medicine
Rochester, NewYork
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Consequences of the 1979
Three Mile Island Accident
Continued: Further Comment
As principal investigator ofthe Three Mile
Island (TMI) Accident Study funded by
the TMI Public Health Fund, I appreciate
the space for some observations further to
our reply (1) to Wing's reanalysis (2) of
our study (3,4). Two far from careful or
evenhanded news items (5,6), and your
own editorial (7) call for further comment.
My principal colleagues in this study
(Jan Beyea, Maureen Hatch, Sylvan
Wallenstein) and I are committed to rigor
in science as well as to the public health and
environmental movements. We applaud
your desire to air controversy. But we forsee
and fear the ultimate discredit that poor sci-
ence, together with advocacy parading as
science, can bring to epidemiology and the
movements of which we are a part. The
essential point is that what you label contro-
versy is not controversial in any real sense.
Instead, we have a situation manufac-
tured from misconceptions, misinterpreta-
tions, mistaken logic, and simple error.
Our results and those of Wing et al. (2)
differ in no important respect. Our conclu-
sions do differ: we saw no convincing evi-
dence that cancer incidence was a conse-
quence of the nuclear accident; they claim
there is such evidence. We urge you and
those ofyour readers interested in the issue
to study our original papers and reports
before judging. Your own (5) and other
news reports [for instance, The Lancet (4)]
ignored our published response to the
brouhaha. In that light, we need to expand
on some points and make some new ones.
At the heart ofthe matter, it seems to us,
isWing's assertion that ouroriginal interpre-
tation is based on circular reasoning. He
makes this charge, he says, because we did
not believe in the hypothesis under test. The
first oftwo objections to this charge is that it
is untrue. We had no such simplistic belief.
At the outset, in thelightofthe uncertainties
about the dose of radiation from the 1979
nudear accident, and also ofa reported clus-
ter of deaths that conceivably pointed to
acceleration of cancers already initiated, we
acceptedthepossibilityofan effect.
At the same time, given the short
postaccident observation period and the
putatively low dose, we were doubtful that
any but the most radiosensitive cancers
could be detected. We did not seek, but
were sought out, to investigate on behalfof
the TMI Public Health Fund. Our accep-
tance of the considerable undertaking
involved was realistic, with no great expec-
tation ofstartling results. Public duty at a
time when fear and unrest beset the affect-
ed communities was a strong motive.
This mistaken allegation about our
beliefs is much the lesser ofour two objec-
tions. The greater objection is to Wing's
claim that circular reasoning led to failure
to prove an apriorihypothesis we allegedly
did not believe. To test an apriorihypoth-
esis, which we did, is ofcourse a procedure
specifically designed to preclude circulari-
ty. More disturbing is the religious cast of
mind this charge displays. To make a prior
beliefa criterion forjudging evidence is the
very antithesis of any scientific or logical
method, from the inductivist Francis
Bacon early in the 17th century to the
hypothetico-deductive Karl Popper in the
20th. Whatever we do, we must surely aim
for a maximum of rigor and objectivity.
One is obliged to attempt disproof no less
than verification. In striving toward elusive
truth, apriori belief is beside the scientific
point. Passionate belief, which character-
ized Wing, maywell be a handicap.
An apriorihypothesis subject to test, by
contrast, is a considerable asset regardless of
belief. Wing's position amounts to a charge
that we are either incapable ofunderstand-
ing our data-on that score let our records
speak-or that we obfuscate or lie. In your
news report (5), indeed, Wing suggests the
latter: he is quoted as ascribing our conclu-
sions to author bias. (In this respect, should
there not have been mention of Wing's
role, with regard to the accident, as witness
for the plaintiffin personal injury litigation
against the TMI utilities?)
Wing's more specific case against our
report rests mainly on two particular issues,
namely, his use of relative rather than
absolute dose and the adjustments he made
for baseline conditions. Let us take these in
turn.
Wing makes much ofhis use ofrelative
dose as "an alternative logical approach"
and seems to reproach us on this score [see
Wing et al. (2), page 53, second and third
columns]. Although they later note that we
in fact used relative dose, in remarks to the
press (5) we are again reproved. So we
must make clear that all our major analyses
and results in fact derived precisely from
the use ofrelative dose.
Relative dose is not an exact or com-
plete description ofwhat we did. In a major
and labor-intensive effort, one of us U.
Beyea) carried out detailed topographic and
meteorologic mapping ofthe area to model
estimates of the direction and concentra-
tion of radiation emissions from the acci-
dent, from routine operations ofthe plant,
and from background radiation. To our
knowledge, ours was a unique approach to
deriving exposure measures in the face of
uncertain actual dose. We also divided the
local area at risk into 69 census-derived
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